The impact of regulation on financial intermediation by Vittas, Dimitri
.Ss  c) 
Policy,  Research,  and External  Affairs
"WORKING  PAPERS
Financial  Policy  anrd  Systems
Country  Economics  Department
The  World  Bank
August  1991
WPS 746




Financial systems are subject to extensive regulation in both
developed and developing countries. The challenge for policy-
makers is to create a robust regulatory framework that promotes
stability and efficiency and avoids the need for costly interven-
tions.
Ihe  Poiiey, Research, and Extemal Affairs Complex  distributes  PRK  Working  Papers  to  disseminate  the  findings of work in progrcss  and
to encourage  the  exchange  of ideas  among  Bank staff and  all oLhcrs  irntcrested  in development  issues.  These  papcrs  carry  the narnes  of
the authors,  reflect only their views, and  should  be  uscd  and  cited accordingly.  'Ie  rindings, interpretations,  and  conclusions  are the
















































































































dPolicy,  Research,  and External  Affalnrs
Fnnclal  Policy  and  Systems
WPS 746
This paper-a  product of the Financial Policy and Systcms Division,  Country Economics Department
- is part of a larger effort in PRE to study the impact of regulation in the financial sector.  Copies are
available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact Wilai
Pitayatonakam, room N9-003, extension 37666 (25 pages).
Financial regulation has a pervasive impact on  Such controls are often motivated by political
the structure and efficiency of financial interme-  considerations, such as preserving the monopoly
diation.  It is perhaps ule most important deter-  position of domestic banks or protecting the turfs
minant of differences exhibited by countries at a  of different types of finanicial  institutions.
similar level of economic development and with
access to common technologies.  He maintains that many of the problems
facing the U.S. financial system, such as the
The 1980s witnessed extensive deregulation  fragmrnted and fragile banking system, the
and reregulation.  Understanding the rationale  financial crisis of the thrift industry, and the
for removing some regulations and introducing  segmented banking and nonbanking parts of the
others is essential for designing and implement-  financial system, can be attributed to the adverse
ing effective regulatory reform.  effects of structural regulations.
Vittas classifies financial regulations by their  Historical experience also suggests that
primary objective into six types: macroeco-  regulatory reform can take place more easily if it
nomic, allocative, structural, prudential, organi-  can be accomplished without cumbersome
zational, and protective.  He notes that most  legislative changes.  In fact, the threat of regula-
regulations have effects that cut across different  tion, if prompt action is feasible, may be as
objectives.  effective as actual regulation.
Historical experience sugg-f.s that macro-  Vittas argues that the most important task
economic and allocative controls tend to be  facing policymakers is creating a sound and
ineffective and inefficient.  It also shows that  robust financial constitution that govems what
prudential, organizational, and protective con-  financial institutions are permnitted  to do and
trols are necessary because financial systems  what basic conditions they have to meet.  But, he
(1) suffer from moral hazard, adverse selection,  adds, the financial constitution needs to be, as far
and the free rider problem; (2) are susceptible to  as possible, neutral between different types of
imprudent and fraudulent behavior; and (3) are  financial intermnediaries  and markets.  Such a
prone to instability and crisis.  framework would contribute to higher efficiency
and stability in the first place and would thus
Vittas argues that structural controls are the  avoid the cost of later interventions.
most controversial types of financial regulation.
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This Is a revised and expanded  version of a paper presented at the
EDI/Harvard  Law School Seminar  on "Financial Sector Liberalization  and
Regulation", Cambr!dge,  Massachusetts,  June 1990.Financial  regulation  has a pervasve  impact  on the structure  and efficiency  of
financial  intermediation.  It is perhaps  the most important  determinant  of differences  in
financial  structure  that are exhibited  by countries  at a similar  level  of economic
development  and with access  to common  technologies.  Regulation  also affects  the
efficiency  of financial  institutions  through  its impact  on competitive  practices,  financial  and
technologit  al innovation,  and  transaction  costs.
Historical  accidents  and differences  in financial  culture  also  influence  the shape  ar.d
behavior  of a country's  financial  system. The importance  of regulation  lies  in the fact that
it is shaped  by policymakers  and is, therefore,  amenable  to radical  change. In contrast,
historical  accidents  are by definition  outside  the control  of policyrmakers,  while financial
cultures  reflect  habits  that change  slowly over  time.
Although  financial  regulation  is amenable  to radical  change,  it is not an exogenous
process  imposed  from without on a country's  financial  institutions  and markets. Rather,
both  regulation  and  deregulation  are part of an  endogenous  response  to changes  in
financial  systems,  and especially  to financial  crises  and  to real or perceived  problems  in the
functioning  of financial  systems.
Regulation  is also influenced  by political  and  social  pressures.  Some  of these
reflect  the interests  of special  groups,  which often include  the firms  that are subject  to
regulation. Others  reflect  basic  beliefs  and perceptions  of different  societies  about  the role
of the financial  sys.em  and its interaction  with the "real" sectors  of the economy. Like
regulation  itself, social  and  political  beliefs  are  not exogenous,  but are shaped  by the
historical  performance  of the financial  system. Historical  accidents,  in particular,  have  as
large  an impact  on values  and  perceptions  as they have  on regulatory  practices.
Thus,  the aversion  to inflation  that characterizes  current  attitudes  in Germany  is
rooted  in the disastrous  experience  with hyperinflation  in the 1  920s  and again  in the
1940s. Similarly,  the reliance  on direct  credit  controls  in many  countries,  both  developed
and  developing,  in the first two decades  after  World  War 11  can be attributed  to the
massive  failures  of financial  institutions  and  the devastating  impact  of the Great
Depression.  In a simiiar  vein,  the hostility  towards  foreign  banks  in many  developing
1countries  was bred  during  colonial  times  when  foreign  banks  were little more  than colonial
institutions.
But although  historical  accidents  have  a strong  impact  on the formation  of social
and political  values  and beliefs,  their influence  fades with the passage  of time. New
historical  experiences  cause  a gradual  change  in attitudes  and  lead  in due  course  to a
reconsideration  of prevailing  poli-4es.
The  endogeneity  of the whole process  may  suggest  a fatalistic  approach,  but this
need  not be so. There  is a positive  and most  important  role  to be  played  by political
leadership  when  the values  and beliefs  of society  about  the structure  and  role of financial
systems  ate  contrary  to the fundamental  regulatory  requirements  of efficient and stable
financial  systems. Political  leadership  is very important  in the area  of prudential  regulation
and supervision  where  supervisory  agencies  need  to be  awarded  decisive  powers  of
intervention and crisis resolution (Polizatto 1990).  It is also crucial for the success  of
financial  restructuring  operations  when political  considerations  must be set aside  in order
to ensure  the viab;lity  of restructured  institutions. But political  leadership  is perhaps  even
more  important  in creating  a sound  and robust  framework  of regulation  that contributes  to
higher  efficiency  and stability  in the first place  and  thus avoids  the need  and cost of later
interventions.
Assessing  the impact  of regulation  on stru-ture and  efficiency  is a complex  exercise
because  a variety  of regulations  are required  to meet  a variety  of objectives. There  is no
simple  correspondence  between  objectives  and  effects. Moreover,  there  is a constant
interaction  between  regulation  and market  practice. Financial  innovation  and technological
progress  undermine  the effectiveness  of regulation  and often cause  radical  changes  in
regulatory  philosophies.  A constant  process  of evaluation  and  adjustment  may  be required
to maximize  the benefits  (and  minimize  the costs)  of financial  regulation.
To be effective,  political  leadership  requires  a thorough  understanding  of the merits
and  demerits  of different types  of regulations  and different  regulatory  approaches.  There
is an interesting  contrast  between  the widespread  perception  of financial  deregulation  in
the 1980s  with the growing  realization  of the need  for prudential  and  other regulations
that ensure  the soundness  and stability  of financial  systems. Understanding  the rationale
2for removing some regulations and introducing others is essential for the design and
implementation of effective regulatory reform'.
This paper discusses the rationale and objectives of financial regulation and reviews
its impact in both developing and developed  countries over the past forty years or so.  The
paper highlights the interaction between different types of regulation and emphasizes  the
importance of a sound and robust financial constitution.
d.  OBJECTIVES  OF FINANCIALREGULAIO
TI  Hatign  f  Financial  Regulation
Financial intermediaries  and markets are subject to extensive regulation in both
developed  and developing countries.  To be sure finance is not unique in this regard.
Other industries, such as utilities, pharmaceuticals,  airlines and nuclear  energy, are also
subject to extensive regulation for both good and bad reasons. The main rationale for
financial regulation is the existence of market failure in financial systems arising from
externalities, market power and information problems.
Externalities  include the risk of systemic failure (i.e the risk of failure of one or more
institutions as a result of the actual or threatened failure of another), the infection effect
(i.e. the general lowering of standards and prices caused by excessive  competition) and
network effects (the costs and benefits of linking together competing institutions to a
common network).  Other externalities are the achievement of macrostability (to avoid the
distortions in relative prices, incentives and expectations caused by high and volatile
inflation) and the enhancement  of the allocative efficiency of the financial system (to
ensure the financing of projects and sectors, including small firms, that have dynamic
efficiency benefits).
Concern  about market power stems from the fear that dominant firms may
undermine both allocative and dynamic efficiency (the former, by charging high prices and
earning excessive profits and the latter by avoiding competitive pressures). Finally,
information problems  arise from poor price and product information, from the free rider
I  The contrast between deregulation in some areas and more extensive regulation in
others is similar in many respects to that between trade and investment liberalization, on
the one hand, and strengthening of competition or antitrust policy, on the other (for a
discussion of competition policy and its interaction with trade liberalization, see Boner and
Krueger 1991).
3problem,  and from informational  asymmetries  between  the suppliers  and users  of financial
services 2.
Market  failure  is a necessary  but t-3t sufficient  condition  for regulation. The other
condition  Is that regulation  can  correct market  failure  in an effective  and  efficient way.
Much of the debate  among  alternative  theories  of regulation  is about  the cost and
effectiveness  of regulation  rather  than about  its rationale.
Too~  Fiancial Regulation
Whatever  its rationale,  the ultimate  goals  of financial  regulation  are the achievement
of efficiency,  stability  and fairness,  not only in the financial  sector  but also  in the economy
at large. To achieve  these  ultimate  goals,  governments  adopt  various  direct controls  and
interventions  that can be classified  in six categories  depending  on their particular
objectives:
a.  macroeconomic  controls  - to maintain  overall  control  over  the level  of
aggregate  economic  activity and  contain  major  internal  and external
imbalances  (reserve  requirements,  direct  credit and  deposit  ceilings,  interest
rate  controls,  and restrictions  on foreign  investments);
b.  allocative  controls - to influence  the allocation  of financiaP  resources  in favor
of priority  activities  (selective  credit programs,  compulsory  investment
requirements  and  preferential  interest  rates);
C.  structural  contro6 - to control  the structure  of the financial  system  (entry
and  merger  controls,  geographic  restrictions,  and limits on the range  of
activities of different  types of financial  institutions);
d.  prudential  controls - to preserve  the safety and  soundness  of individual
financial  institutions  and sustain  public  confidence  in the stability of the
financial  system  as a whole (authorization  criteria,  minimum  capital
requirements,  limits on the concentration  of risks,  and  reporting
requirements);
e.  organizational  controls -to ensure  the smooth  functioning  and integrity  of
financial  markets  and information  exchanges  (rules  of market  making  end
2  For an interesting  discussion  of the rationale  for financial  regulation,  see Kay  and
Vickers  (1988).
. . . . . . . .. . .~~participation,  disclosure  of market  information,  and  minimum  technical
standards);  and
f.  protective  controls - to provide  adequate  protection  to users  of financial
services,  especially  consumers  and nonprofessional  investors  (information
disclosure  to consumers,  compensation  funds,  and ornmudsmen  offices  to
investigate  and  resolve  disputes).
Differences  in financial  structure  may also  arise  from differences  in company  law
that affect the formationi  of different  types  of companies  (joint  stock companies,  limited
partnerships,  etc.) and  in the organization  of a country's social  security  system. The
effect of these  regulations  is similar  to that of structural  controls  on financial  institutions.
Macroeconomic  controls  Macroeconomic  controls,  and  especially  the use of direct
credit ceilings,  have  often been  motivated  by the paramount  importance  of controlling  the
expansion  of credit and maintaining  price  stability. The case  for the use of macroeconomic
controls  is strengthened  in many  countries  by the absence  of adequate  market
mechanisms  for the operation  of indirect  methods  of monetary  and  crddit control.
However,  both  economic  theory  and historical  experience  suggest  that the macroeconomic
objectives  of financial  regulation  can be achieved  more  efficiently  by market-based
mechanisms  that do not distort  competition  between  individual  institutions  and  between
different  types  of financial  institutions. Rather  than relying  on the use of direct credit
ceilings  and  interest  rate  controls  that stifle competition  and inhibit innovation,
governments  should  stimulate  the development  of efficient money  and government  bond
markets.
Allocatime  controls. Allocative  controls  have  been  motivated  by the desire  to
compensate  for the tendency  of financial  institutions,  and  especially  of commercial  banks,
to finance  either  low risk activities,  such  as short-term  trade  finance,  or high risk
speculative  projects  with short payback  periods,  such  as real  estate  development.
Commercial  banks  are  generally  less  willing  to finance  investment  projects  with high risks
and  long payback  periods,  even  though  they may  have  beneficial  effects on total factor
productivity. They  are also  generally  reluctant  to finance  small  firms  without adequate
collateral,  even  though  such firms  may be  innovative  and promise  high returns. The
rationale  for intervention  is then the need  to direct financial  resources  to uses  with
dynamic  efficiency  benefits. Allocative  controls  are  often combined  with macroeconomic
5controls that aim to limit the total supply of credit without  raising the level of interest
rates.
However, the existence of this externality provides a good example of the argument
that market failure is a  necessary  but not a sufficient condition for regulation.  There are
many reasons why commercial banks may be unwilling to lend for projects with long
payback periods or to small firms without adequate collateral:  investment projects may be
subject to high uncertainty, which may be compounded  by high inflation and
macroeconomic  instability; commercial banks may be relying on short-term deposits and
may thus be unwilling to assume the higher interest rate and credit risk exposure of long-
term lending; accounting and auditing standards may be very weak limiting the quantity
and quality of information available to lenders, especially on the performance  and
prospects of small firms; and legal procedures for collateral, foreclosure and debt recovery
may be very ineffective.
The absence  of capital markets and other sources of long-term finance (including
venture capital and equity finance) may compound the shortage of investment and small
firm finance, but the imposition of allocative controls, involving directed credit programs
and preferential interest rates, is unlikely to be effective if no action is taken to improve
the legal and accounting systems or to develop more appropriate sources of funding.
Moreover, without  a better monitoring of both banks and their borrowers, allocative
controls suffer from the problem of moral hazard, as subsidized  resources  tend to be
diverted to unauthorized uses.
Very few countries have been able to design and implement effective allocative
controls.  Where they have worked, these have been based  on the achievement of overall
macroeconomic  stability and the development of quite effective monitoring systems.  In
fact, the general case for allocative controls has been undermined  by the failure of most
countries to design and implement effective and efficient controls.  In general, the
experience  of most countries implies  that the scope of allocative controls should be limited
and that any subsidization  of the cost of credit should also be small.
StructUral  controls.  Structural controls are mainly motivated by economic and
political considerations.  For instance, the legal separation of commercial  and investment
banking and other restrictions on the permitted types of activities of banks mainly aim at
preventing undue concentration of economic  and financial power.  Structural controls often
6discourage, or even prohibit, the maintenance  of close links between the suppliers and
users of financial services because  of the notential conflicts of interest that may arise and
the potential abuse of information and financial flows.  Restrictions on new entry by
foreign banks (including restrict;ons on interstate banking in the United States) aim to
protect the position of indigenous institutions.  In addition, controls on the expansion of
operations in foreign countries are often motivated by the desire to channel financial
resources in the domestic (or local) market.
Structural controls aim to deal mainly with problems  caused by market power.  But
by putting limits on the size and diversification of individual firms they may cause a
fragmentation and segmentation of the financial system and may also prevent large firms
from achieving economies of scale and scope. They may also weaken the incentives of
individual institutions to invest in the acquisition, processing and dissemination of
information and may thus aggravate  the free rider problem.
Pr1dential  c  trols.  Prud3ntial  controls aim to reduce the risk of systemic failure
and avoid the disruptions c.uz.ec by financial crises.  They require financial institutions to
be adequately capitalized, professionally  managed,  diversify their risks, adopt proper
accountirg policies, report the.. true financial position and be subject to effective
supervision. They impose "fit and proper" tests on the managers  and owners of financial
institutions to minimize adverse selection and detailed conduct rules to guard against moral
hazard.
Prudential controls are necessary because  financial institutions are susceptible to
both imprudent and fraudulent behavior. Experience  has shown that private financial
institutions make mistakes and their decisions are imperfect and prone  to excesses.
Market-based  financial systems, like public ones, are subject to fraud and instability.  A
main concern of prudential regulation is the acievement  of stability without undermining
efficiency, though it is not clear to what extent prudential controls can be devised that are
based on market mechanisms  and do not distort competition and financial behavior.
Organizational  controls.  Organizational  controls aim to cope with the externalities
caused by the existence of networks such as stock and other trading ex..nanges, payment
clearing systems, and information networks.  By setting out the rights and obligations of
market participants on objective criteria, such as technical competence  and financial
7standing,  they promote  the efficiency  ar I integrity  of no.works  without discriminating
against  new Institutions.
Protective  contros.  Protective  controls  deal  with  hie  information  problems  that
affect the relations  of financial  institutions  with their customers,  especially  small  ones.
These  arise  from  the existence  of informaticnal  asymmetries  between  the suppliers  and
users  of financial  services  and from poor  price  information.  In most  markets,  the main
informational  asymmetry  is the inability  of consumers  to judge  the quality  of the service
being  purchased.  But in banking  and insurance,  asymmetric  information  also  affects the
suppliers  of financial  services, Financial  institutions  often lack  adequate  information  on the
behavior  of their customers  that may  aftect their  creditworthiness  and insurability.
One  way to deal  with asymmetric  information  is by specifying  contracts  that
impose  restrictions  on behavior  and  discriminate  between  high  and low risk  customers.
However,  these  may  be open  to abuse  by individual  institutions  and  regulation  about
contract  terms and  conduct  rules  is required  to protect  the interests  of consumers.
Protective  controls  may  also be  required  to ensure  the quality of price  information  that is
provided  to consumers.  This need  is greater  where  products  are  not standardized  and
markets  are fragmented  and where  there  is price  dispersion  and uncertainty  about  the
quality  of products.
Interaction  and Overlap  of Financial  RegulatiQns
Although  financial  regulations  are usually  introduced  with a particular  objective  in
mind,  they tend  to have  effects  that cut across  different objectives. For example,  credit
ceilings  are mainly  applied  for macroeconomic  purposes,  but they also  restrain  banks  from
engaging  in an uncontrolled  and imprudent  expansion  of credit and  thus serve  to fulfil a
prudential  objective. Moreover,  because  they tend  to stifle competition  among  banks,
credit  ceilings  also  have  a structural  effect.
Similarly,  global  interest  rate  controls  can have  both macroeconomic  and prudential
objectives,  while branching  restrictions  tend to have  both structural  and prudential  effects.
In many  countriee.  interest  rate and  branching  controls  were  introduced  after the Great
Depression  in order  to curtail  excessive  and destructive  competition  among  banks. In the
insurance  industry,  price  and product  controls  are  extensively  applied  for prudential  rather
than allocative  purposes,  but such  controls  also  have  pervasive  effects on the structure  of
insurance  markets.
8Even  the modern  approach  to prudential  regulation,  which  emphasizes  risk-based
capital  requirements,  subject  to a minimum  capital  for new entrants,  has  structural  effects
since  it may discourage  new entry and  may  differentiate  in favor of some  activities  as a
result of the risk weights  that are  applied  to different  types of assets.
Orgarn;zational  controls  are clearly  essential  for the development  of financial
networks,  but such  controls  may  discriminate  against  particular  groups  of institutions,
such  as foreign  banks,  and may  thus have  direct effects  on the structure  of financial
markets.
Regulations  for consumer  and investor  protection  may also  have  both  prudential  and
structural  effects. To protect  the interests  of investors  financial  institutions  may be
induced  to adopt  more  prudent  practices,  while increased  requirements  for information
disclosure  and  the cost of compliance  with an array  or complex  regulations  may increase
operating  costs and  thus discouwage  new entry.
Structural  controls  are motivated  by political  considerations  to prevent  excessive
concentration  of market  power,  but by limiting  the risks  that different  institutions  can
assume  they may  also  have  prudential  effects. On  the other  hand,  some  structural
controls  may  undermine  the effectiveness  of prudential  regulation. This is because  they
may cause  a fragmentation  of the financial  system  into a large  number  of small  institutions
with limited  capital  resources.  Both  the risk of systemic  failure  and the risk of infection
are likely  to be greater  in fragmented  systems. In contrast,  consolidated  financial  systems
with a high degree  of concentration  are likely  to be more  stable  and  much less  exposed  to
systemic  risk. Structural  controls  on toreign  investments  by domestic  institutions  may
have  adverse  prudential  effects in that they may  impede  risk diversification  and increase
the fragility  of individual  institutions.
There  is clearly  a tradeoff  between  the various  objectives  of financial  regulation  and
especially  between  controls  that stimulate  competition,  efficiency  and innovation  on the
one hand  and  those  that promote  stability,  safety  and fairness  on the other.
In this regard,  it is worth emphasizing  that the most  important  and fundamental
regulatory  action is the enactment  of what may be  called  the basic  financial  constitution  of
a country. This  should  cover  the structural,  prudential,  organizational  and protective
regulations  discussed  above  and  should  govern  what financial  institutions  are permitted  todo, where they can operate, who is allowed to own or maanage  them, and what basic
conditions they have to meet.
A sound and robust financial constitution would not place arbitrary entry, branching
and merger restrictions on individual financial institutions and would encourage them both
to diversify their risks and to accumulate substantial capital reserves that would then be
available  to absorb losses. In many ways, it would define the ability of financial
institutions to exploit economies of scale and scope and generally operate on a sound and
managerially  efficient basis. Individual financial institutions would have a strong incentive
to develop effective internal audit and control systems, thus reducing the amount of
external policing that financial supervisors have to undertake and placing a smaller burden
on the resources of compensation funds.
A sound and robust financial constitution should be complemented with a system
of effective supervision.  Financial  supervision is important in order to ensure that the
various rules and regulations are complied with.  Traditionally, supervision was mostly
concerned to ensure compliance  with the various credit and exchange controls, but
increasingly greater attention is focussed on ensuring the adoption of prudent and sound
practices.  It also has a crucial part to play in preventing attempts to cover up losses and
thus stopping them from being magnified out of control.
Other forms of regulatory action include financial accommodation, through the
lender-of-last-resort  facility, to deal with short-term liquidity problems  and financial
restructuring, through intervention by the appropriate authorities, to deal with more
permanent  solvency crises.  Compensation  funds in general, and deposit insurance in
particular, also have a role to play, especially in protecting the interests of small investors.
But if they attempt to safeguard  financial stability by preventing runs on fragmented and
fragile individual institutions, they are likely to create major distortions in incentives and to
suffer from the problems of moral hazard  and adverse  selection.
In the United States proposals  for reforming deposit insurance have received
extensive publicity following the debacle of thrift institutions.  But discussing deposit
insurance in isolation from other regulatory issues is not very meaningful.  Indeed, a
financial coristitution that avoids the fragmentation and segmentation of the financial
10system and discourages  the continuing existence of fragile institutions can lead to greater
3 stability and efficiency than any reform of deposit insurance
Ill.  THE IMPACT  OF FINANCIAL  REGULATION  AND DEREGULATION
Financial  Regulation  in Developing Countries.
Financial  regulation in developing countries was very extensive in the immediate
postwar or post-independence  period.  Most regulations had macroeconomic, allocative
and structural objectives, while prudential regulation and supervision  were conspicuous by
their absence  as were controls to protect consumers and nonprofessional  investors.  To a
large extent this reflected the emphasis  placed on two of the sources of market failure
identified above:  externalities and market power.  Information problems  generally received
little attention in most developing countries.  Moreover, the ability of the regulatory system
to correct market failures was taken for granted.
Although prudential regulations were mostly absent, direct controls had a prudential
effect by inhibiting banks from expanding  too fast and engaging  in imprudent and
excessive competition.  On the other hand, failure to provide for Drudent  policies on
suspending  interest accrual on nonperforming  loans and for loan provisioning against
doubtful debts resulted in many cases in a build up of nonperforming  loans and
unrecognized  losses that undermined  the financial standing of both commercial and
development banks (World Bank, 1990).
Moreover, failure to monitor the performance  of borrowers, especially large state-
owned firms in strategic sectors, resulted in both overleveraging  of individual companies
and abuse of subsidized  credit facilities.  In many countries, industrial and financial
conglomerates  used their control over finance to capture economic  rents by passing cheap
credits to related firms, engage  in speculative ventures and deny credit to potential
competitors.
Extensive exchange  controls limited the scope for risk diversification and isolated
domestic financial systems from developments  in international financial markets.  Foreign
3  The recent proposal of the US Treasury for a major overhaul of banking regulation
implicitly recognizes  the importance of these points.  The proposal  aims to abolish the legal
separation between commercial  and investment banking, between banking and insurance,
and between banking and industry or commerce. It also aims to reform the structure of
financial regulation and the operation of deposit insurance (US  Treasury, 1991).
11financial institutions, especially  deposit banks and insurance companies, were prevented
from entering domestic markets and from engaging  in a beneficial transfer of financial
technology and financial innovation.
To be sure most developed  countries, ranging from Scandinavia  to Central Europe
and the Mediterranean  Region  and farther away to Australia and New Zealand, also applied
similar types of controls.  The main difference between developing and developed
countries was in the extent and severity of controls.  In general,  these were far more
extensive and comprehensive  in developing  than in developed  countries and this had a
discernible  impact on the functioning and efficiency of national financial systems.
Apart from stifling competition and inhibiting innovation, financial regIlation also
had an impact on the overall structure of financial intermediation. In several-countries,
nonbank financial intermediaries,  such as finance and leasing companies, were left out of
the tight regulatory regime, either by design or by accident (Cho 1989).  As a result, such
companies  were able to grow by paying high interest rates, although in many countries
(e.g. Malaysia, Thailand, Sri Lanka and Pakistan)  finance companies engaged  in imprudent
or fraudulent operations and caused  financial crises and losses for depositors.
In the 1  980s several developing countries, following the precedent set by some
developed  countries, such as France  and Japan, used financial regulation as a means of
stimulating the development of capital markets.  These  involved both allowing higher
interest rates on company debentures than on bank deposits and providing strong fiscal
incentives for issuing and investing in company securities.
Another way in which regulation affected the structure of financial intermediation
was through the establishment of national provident funds or more generally through the
promotion of contractual savings institutions.  Two countries, Singapore  and Malaysia,
established  employee provident funds with high contribution rates and substantial long
term savings.  In Korea, Zimbabwe, Chile and a few other countries, various types of
contractual savings institutions, covering life insurance and pension plans, were
encouraged  to grow and play a significant part in the mobilization of domestic long-term
financial savings and the development of capital markets.
Financial Regulation  in DeveloDed  Counties.
Macroeconomic and allocative controls, including credit ceilings, interest rate
controls, reserve requirements and directed credit programs, were extensively used in
12most developed  countries, especially  during the period of reconstruction and high growth,
following the end of World War II.  This was particularly the case in Japan (Patrick 1984,
Teranishi 1986), but was also true of most continental European  countries 4. However,
Germany  and the United States made little use of credit ceilings, while Germany, the
Netherlands,  Switzerland and the United Kingdom  either had no recourse to interest rate
controls and branching restrictions or removed them at quite an early stage.
Many countries imposed  extensive structural controls, separating commercial and
investment banking, limiting the scope of activities of specialized  housing, rural and
savings banks, and restricting the expansion of regional institutions, although Germany  and
some other European  countries refrained  from imposing structural controls and generally
allowed both their commercial  and savings banks to operate as universal banks. Among
OECD  countries, the use of structural controls was most extensive in the United States,
Italy, Norway and Japan.
In the United States structural controls, especially branching restrictions dating
from the nineteenth century, caused a fragmentation of the banking and thrift  industries
that increased  their fragility and susceptibility to financial crises.  Following the massive
failures of banks and thrifts in the 1  930s, two deposit insurance funds were created to
prevent runs on individual institutions and, thus, protect the stability of the system.  The
thrift industry was also subjected to a series of controls and restrictions that maximized  its
exposure  to interest rate, sectoral and geographic  risks 5.
The fragmentation of the banking industry and the absence of nationwide banks
stimulated the development  of corporate securities markets and the growth of investment
banking. In the postwar period, the structural controls imposed on banks have been
4  For a review of financial regulation in the 1960s and 1970s in several developed
countries, see Vittas et al (1  978).
5  The recent experience  of US savings and loan associations  contrasts sharply with
the continuing prosperity and success  of UK building societies.  The impact of regulation
on the thrift industries in the UK and the US is discussed  in Vittas (1991).
13instrumental in contributing to the growth of the commercial paper market and to the
emergence  and growth of money market mutual funds 6.
In the United Kingdom the institutional segmentation between commercial (clearing)
banks and merchant banks was not imposed by regulation, but reflected the traditional
concerns and prevailing practices of major banks. The absence  of branching controls and
other rigid regulatory restrictions permitted the emergence  of large commercial banks with
nationwide operations that were able to diversify progressively  into other areas, such as
hire purchase  finance, merchant and investment banking, mutual funds, insurance broking
and, more recently, stockbroking and real estate broking.  In contrast to commercial banks,
savings banks and building societies were compelled to specialize  in collecting retail
deposits from households  and investing them in government securities in the case of
savings banks and housing loans in the case of building societies.  However, neither type
of institution was prevented from expanding  operations on a national scale.
Most countries paid little attention to prudential, organizational  and protective
regulations, although Germany  and Switzerland imposed rather strict prudential controls on
both banks and insurance companies'.  In the United Kingdom, prudential regulation was
mostly based on informal arrangements. This was facilitated by the small number of
banks and the greater consolidation of the UK banking system.  In contrast, in the United
States, the use of deposit insurance  and the large number of deposit institutions
necessitated  the imposition of detailed prudential controls and the development of an
extensive machinery of examination and supervision.  Because  of the fragmented structure
of the US banking system, the supervisory process was forced to rely on large numbers of
skilled examiners  for probing the integrity of bank managers  and second-guessing  their
business  decisions. Policing costs were externalized and bank losses covered to a large
6  In this respect, it is worth noting that the commercial paper  market has expanded
at a rapid pace in Spain, Portugal  and France,  countries where banks have been subjected
to extensive credit ceilings but not in other European  countries such as the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands  or Germany. Moreover, money market mutual funds have
generally  thrived in countries with strict controls on interest rates on retail deposits, such
as the United States, Japan, France  and Australia but not in the United Kingdom, Sweden
and other European  countries where deposit institutions have been free from interest rate
restrictions and high interest has been offered on various types of bank accounts.
7  For a discussion of insurance regulation in Germany,  see Finsinger  et al (1985),
Finsinger  and Pauly (1986) and Rabe  (1990).
14extent by deposit  insurance  funds  and ultimately  by taxpayers  if the reserves  of the funds
were not adequate. In more  consolidated  banking  systems,  policing  costs  were
internalized  and losses  at the branch  level  were  absorbed  to a greater  extent  by bank
shareholders.
The  limited use  of macroeconomic  and allocative  controls  but extensive  reliance  on
structural  controls  in the United  States  contrasts  rather  sharply  with the experience  of
most  European  countries. As documented  by banking  historians",  the fragmentation  of
the banking  and thrift industries  reflect  a strong  tradition  of localism  in American  banking
that was based  on populist  policies  motivated  by fear of the concentration  of power  that
large  banks  from out-of-state  centers  might acquire. Neither  politicians  nor economists
have  done  much to dispel  this fear.
The restrictions  on the geographic  expansion  of banks  have  prevented  the
emergence  of large  banks  with nationwide  operations.  In some  states,  branching
restrictions  have  confined  banks  to very small  geographic  areas. Geographic  restrictions
have  been  eroded  in recent  years,  although  the fragmentation  of the industry  still persists.
One  could  argue  that economists  have  undermined  potential  support  for consolidation  of
the banking  and thrift systems  by downplaying  the potential  economies  of scale  and  scope
of large  banks. By focussing  on the production  side of banking  services  and  neglecting
potential  economies  in risk  and marketing,  they have  largely  failed  to establish  a strong
case  for greater  consolidation.  Politicians  responded  to the financial  crisis  of the 1930s  by
introducing  deposit  insurance,  despite  some  early  concerns  about  the distortion  of
incentives  but failed  to allow a consolidation  of both industries.
The  fear of out-of-state  banks  may  have  made  sense  when  communications  were
poor  and the ability  to regulate  and supervise  large  institutions  with nationwide  operations
may  have  been  limited. But  improvements  in communications  and  regulatory  practices
should  have  removed  any concern  about  the ability  to control  large  institutions  and prevent
them from abusing  their market  power. Lack  of political  leadership,  which may  partly be
explained  by the belief  that deposit  insurance  imparted  a sufficient  degree  of financial
stability, has  allowed  this irrational  structure  of regulation  to persist. However,  as already
8  See  Hammond  (1957) and Krooss and Blyn  (1971).
15noted cbove,  the recent  thrift crisis and  the poor  financial  condition  of a large  number  of
banks  suggest  that a major  overhaul  of bank  and  thrift regulation  is now likely.
Eina_ncial ereagulatgo  In DeveloRed  Countrejs.
Most developed  countries  have  undertaken  extensive  deregulation  of their financial
systems  since  the late 1970s, although  the focus and pace  of deregulation  have  varied
considerably  across  countries. In many  countries,  deregulation  has primarily  affected  the
provision  of corporate  financial  services.
A good  example  of this approach  is Japan,  where  financial  deregulation  has
involved  the progressive  relaxation  of restrictions  on domestic  and  foreign  bond  issues  and
the liberalization  of interest  rates on bank  loans  and large  deposits  (Hoshi  et al 1989). In
retail  banking  many  regulations  are  still imposed,  limiting  opportunities  for branch  network
expansion  and controlling  interest  rates on retail  deposits.
Financial  deregulation  has  been  accompanied  by an explosive  growth of activity on
the securities  markets  which  now play  a central  part  in the Japanese  financial  system.
The  creation  of markets  for financial  futures  and options  has  further increased  the
flexibility of the financial  system. Although  the role of banks  in corporate  finance  has
declined,  close  links  between  banks  and  industrial  companies  and extensive  cross-
shareholdings  among  firms  belonging  to conglomerate  groups  continue  to predominate.
In France,  deregulation  has been  more  extensive  and has  involved  the abolition  of
the legal  separation  of commercial  and investment  banks,  the lifting of branching
restrictions,  and  the relaxation  of interest  rate  controls  on loans  and large  deposits. But
controls  on retail  deposits  have  continued  to apply  and use  has been  made  of fiscal
incentives  to encourage  households  to invest in marketable  securities  and  contractual
savings. As in the case  of Japan,  there  has been  a large  expansion  of activity in the
money,  capital  and  derivative  markets.
In Germany,  financial  deregulation  has been  less  extensive,  mainly  because  the
system  was  already  quite free  from structural  controls". Because  of the traditional
emphasis  on prudential  and  anti-inflationary  concerns,  authorization  of new financial
instruments  (such  as negotiable  certificates  of deposit,  floating  rate and  zero  coupon
bonds,  and  indexed  instruments)  was considerably  delayed  and this held back  the
9  See  Deutsche  Bundesbank  (1986)  and Broeker  (1989).
16development of active money markets.  Moreover, securities markets for corporate equities
and bonds have continued to be underdeveloped.
The underdevelopment  of German  securities markets may be explained by five
factors.  First, the close links between corporations and the universal banks, which provide
financial and managerial  support for expansion plans and restructuring operations and may
thus mitigate the need for strong financial independence  by the corporate sector.  Second,
the preference  of most medium-sized  companies to operate as limited partnerships' 1 .
Third, the imposition of turnover taxes that affected, in particular, the development of
markets for short-term securities, such as commercial paper.  Fourth, the limited role
played by pension funds in the German  financial system as many company pension
schemes are based  on internal reserves  that are reinvested in the sponsoring companies
and are not available  for investment in marketable  securities.  And, fifth,  the recurrent
crises in the German  financial system, which have undermined  the confidence of the
saving public in marketable  securities and have interrupted the evolution of the German
financial system towards a more varied and balanced  structure".
Financial deregulation in the United Kingdom has involved the abolition of credit
ceilings and exchange controls and the reform of the stock exchange  to allow membership
by banks and other financial institutions.  On the other hand, prudential controls have been
progressively  enshrined in legislation, in line with international developments. There has
also been a major overhaul of organizational  and protective regulations.  The new
regulatory framework covers all firms engaging  in financial services and is based on a
10  It is not clear why unlisted German  firms are reluctant to go public.  For firms with
less than 2,000 employees,  an important reason may be the desire to avoid the burden
imposed by company law on listed companies through the provisions for co-determination
(i.e. the requirement that half the seats on supervisory boards of listed companiee  must be
reserved for representatives  of workers).  For larger firms, which are subject to co-
determination irrespective of legal form, the reluctance to go public may be related to fears
about losing company control and perhaps  also to the lack of any clearly perceived
benefits from listing.
"'  Historical crises occurred as a result of the boom and bust of company promotions
in the 1870s, World War I and the hyperinflation of the 1  920s, the suspension of market
mechanisms  in the 1930s and the devastation of World War 11.  Universal banks playeo a
crucial part in promoting industrialization before World War I and they were called upon
again to play an equally crucial part in financing and supporting the economic
reconstruction effort of the postwar period.
17combination  of statutory  agencies  and  self regulatory  organizations.  It is supported  by a
network of ombudsman  offices  for the independent  examination  of consumer  complaints
and by a series  of compensation  funds for the protection  of small  investors  in all kinds  of
financial  assets.
In the United  Statms  deregulation  has  involved  the removal  of interest  rate controls
and  a gradual  but slow relaxation  of branching  restrictions. In addition,  the wide ranging
restrictions  on the activities  of thrift institutions  were  removed  in response  to the losses
suffered  in the late 1  970s, although  their  new powers  led  to the thrift debacle  that
resulted  from the provision  of deposit  insurance  with deficient  supervision  (White 1990).
There  is now considerable  and growing  pressure  for an overhaul  of the whole
system  of bank  and  thrift regulation. Interest  rate  deregulation  has already  been
completed  and  interstate  barriers  have  been  substantially  reduced  and are likely  to be
completely  eliminated  in the near  future. The  three remaining  issues  are the reform  of
deposit  insurance,  the legal  separation  of commercial  and investment  banking  (or more
generally  the issue  of universal  banking),  and  the permissible  level  of market  concentration.
There  is also  some  concern  about  the growing  volatility of financial  markets  and  the need
to coordinate  the regulation  of different  types  of markets.
Financial  Dareaulation  In Developing  Countries.
In developing  countries,  the experience  of financial  deregulation  has been  more
varied. Many  countries  have  taken  measures  to develop  money  and  capital  markets,
promote  nonbank  financial  intermediaries  and  strengthen  prudential  regulation  and
supervision.  Thore  has  also been  a general  reduction  in the scope  and intensity  of
macroeconomic  and allocative  controls. However,  developing  countries  continue  to place
greater  reliance  than developed  countries  on direct credit controls,  while prudential,
organizational  and protective  controls  have  yet to be  fully developed.
Structural  controls  have  been  reformed  in favor of market-based  mechanisms,
although  many  countries  continue  to restrict  entry of foreign  banks  to the domestic  market
or to place  strict limits on their range  and level  of activities. In countries  where
commercial  and development  banks  were under  public  ownership,  privatization  programs
have  been  implemented  slowly and with caution,  to some  extent  because  of the limited
size  of the domestic  capital  markets. Universal  banking  has  been  permitted  in a growing
isBnumber of countries, even though prudential rogulation and supervision are .lot as well
developed  as in most high income countries.
Financial  deregulation has generally been more successful in countrirs that have
maintained moderate price stability and have adopted a gradualist approach in
implementing their reforms.  In countries where inflation has been too high and the
exchange rate has tended to be overvalued, deregulation has been accompanied  by
considerable  distortions in incentives and has resulted in extensive instability, in terms of
both high real interest rates and massive defaults (Cho and Khatkhate 1989).
IV.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS
The experience of both developed  and developing countries suggests that
regulatory change tends to happen when there are large economic disruptions.  Thus,
extensive financial regulation was introduced in the aftermath of the Great Depression.
More recently, financial deregulation in the 1970s was  motivated by the large increase  in
the level and volatility of inflation, exchange and interest rates.
Regulatory change also takes place more easily if it can be accomplished  without
requiring cumbersome  legislative changes. A corollary of this idea is that the threat of
regulation in a society where regulatory action is not subject to long delays may be as
effective as actual regulation.  In fact, the threat of regulation may be as important a
concept in explaining the behavior of incumbent firms in highly concentrated industries as
the threat of potential competition.  It may, for instance, be an important factor in
Germany  where the large universal banks have been  reticent in exercising their influence
on corporate affairs, although another factor may have been the need to build and sustain
a reputation of good and responsible  behavior.
In both developed  and developing countries financial regulation is now moving
towards the elimination or substantial reduction of macroeconomic, allocative and
structural controls and towards the adoption or substantial strengthening of prudential,
organizational  and protective controls.  One issue that continues, however, to remain
unresolved  is the question of the role and scope of universal banks.
In developed  countr:o.  a consensus  is emerging in favor of universal banks as one
type of institution among a wide range of specialized  financial intermediaries  and a wide
network of financial markets.  The most important remaining  issue concerns  the
organizational  form of universal groups and in particular the usefulness  of a holding
19company  structure  as against  direct involvement  in universal  banking  activities  through
departments  or subsidiaries  of the parent  company.
In developing  countries,  the question  of universal  banking  is closely  linked  with the
development  of more  effective prudential  and  supervisory  mechanisms.  Universal  banking
relies  to a large  extent  on functional  and  conduct  regulation  and implies  a greater  need  for
collecting  and  analyzing  detailed  information  and  for taking prompt  corrective  action.
In the past, universal  banking  has produced  negative  results  in several  developing
countries,  though  in large  part these  may  have  been  encouraged  by the laxity of
supervision  and/or  the availability  of heavily  subsidized  credits  that provided  strong
incentives  for excessive  borrowing  and  for abusing  the system. In a less  distorted
regulatory  framework  and with more  effective  supervision,  universal  banking  may  be able
to make  a more  positive  contribution  to economic  and financial  development  even  in
developing  countries.
Political  leadership  has  a substantial  part  to play  in reforming  the regulatory  system.
Experience  shows  that structural  controls  that are mainly  motivated  by political
considerations,  such  as preserving  the monopoly  position  of domestic  banks  or protecting
the turfs of different types  of financial  institutions,  can be very damacing. Many  of the
problems  facing  the US  financial  system,  such  as  the fragmentation  and  fragility of the
banking  system,  the financial  crisis  of the thrift industry  and  the segmentation  of the
banking  and nonbanking  parts of the financial  system,  can be  attributed  to the adverse
effects of structural  regulations.
Among  developed  countries,  political  leadership  would be required  to remove  any
remaining  restraints  on geographic  and sectoral  diversification  of financial  institutions. The
most  important  task is the creation  of a sound  and robust  financial  constitution  that
governs  what financial  institutions  are permitted  to do and what basic  conditions  they
have  to meet. As far as possible,  the regulatory  framework  should  be neutral  between
different  types of financial  intermediaries  and  markets.
In developing  countries,  political  leadership  would be required  in undertaking  and
implementing  a major  reform  of the regulatory  framework  that would  emphasize  the
prudential,  organizational  and protective  objectives  of financial  regulation  and  downplay
the importance  of macroeconomic,  allocative  and structural  objectives.
20A major  challenge  facing  political  leadership  in developing  countries  lies  in reforming
structural  regulations  to allow foreign  financial  institutions  to play  a more  active part in the
domestic  financial  system. In earlier  periods,  foreign  banks  behaved  like colonial
institutions,  exploiting  local resources  and contributing  relatively  little to local  economic
and financial  development.  But in the modern  world foreign  institutions  (banks,  insurance
companies,  securities  firms, etc.) are more  likely to be beneficial  by transferring  financial
technology  and  training  local  staff, providing  effective  competition  to the large  domestic
institutions  that often dominate  the financial  systems  of developing  countries,  and instilling
greater  stability  in local financial  markets.
Political  leadership  would also  be required  in implementing  an ambitious
privatization  program.  These  would permit  competitive  market  forces  and decentralized
decision  making  to play their full part in mobilizing  and allocating  financial  resources  and in
monitoring  the performance  and controlling  the behavior  of the ultimate  users  of financial
resources.
21One  question  that has not been  explicitly  addressed  in this paper  concerns  the
relevance  of differences  in financial  arrangements.  The  financial  systems  of different
countries  exhibit considerable  differences  in both  structure  and practice  and regulation  is
clearly  a major  oeterminant  of such  differences.  But how important  are  they for economic
performance  and  development?
Unfortunately,  economic  theory  is not very helpful  in answering  this question. As
Gertler  (1988) pointed  out, the working  hypothesis  of most  economists  has  long been  that
the structure  of fir,ancial  intermediation  is irrelevant' 2. This  approach  contrasts  sharply
with the widespread  belief  among  policymakers,  bankers  and other financial  practitioners
that financial  intermediaries  and  markets  play important  roles  in economic  development
and  stability.
A comparison  of data on long-run  economic  growth, as reported  by de Long  (1988),
and  financial  structure  suggest  that countries  characterized  by a greater  reliance  on bank
finance  and close  links  between  banks  and industrial  companies  have  achieved  higher  rates
of economic  growth, especially  in relation  to their economic  potential,  than  countries  with
market-based  systems. The  first group  of countries  includes  Japan,  Germany  and other
continental  European  countries,  and (at least  regarding  close  links  between  industry  and
finance)  the United  States  in the pre-Depression  era. The  second  group  covers  mostly
Anglo-American  countries  (the United  Kingdom  --with Scotland  as a special  case  of an
economic  region  suffering  relative  decline--,  Australia,  New  Zealand  and,  to a lesser  extent,
Canada  and the United  States  in the post-Depression  era).
Differences  in financial  arrangements  are only one of the factors  that may  explain
differences  in economic  performance.  Other  factors, such  as the stance  of
12  "Irrelevance"  propositions  represent  a long  tradition  in economics.  They  cover  the
"money  is a veil" argument,  which  implies  the associated  concept  of the long-run
neutrality  of money,  even  though  it is incompatible  with the view that inflation  distorts
relative  prices,  fuels  speculative  behavior  and misallocates  resources.  They also  cover  the
"finance  is a veil" argument  that argues  that the financial  structure  of corporations  is
irrelevant  for their market  value  and  that investment  and  financing  decisions  can be
completely  separated.  This proposition  is at variance  with observed  practice  in financial
markets,  which emphasizes  the importance  of matching  the maturities  of assets  and
liabilities,  maintaining  stable  dividend  payouts,  minimizing  the cost of capital  and  avoiding
excessive  reliance  on debt finance.
22macroeconomic  policies,  the functioning  of the labor  markets,  the availability  of natural
resources  and historical  accidents,  are  also important. However,  the growing  emphasis
that is being placed in theoretical work on information asymmetries, long-term
relationships  and commitments,  and  the building  of reputations  suggests  that differences
in financial  arrangements  may  be important  and that views about  the irrelevance  of the
structure of financial intermediation may change.
The  new approach  is likely  to pay less  attention  on the distinction  between  bank-
based  and market-based  systems  and to focus  more  on the distinction  between  financial
systems  that emphasize  long-term  relationships  and  those  that emphasize  a more
transactional approach. The former encourage  closer monitoring of the operations of
industrial  companies  and overcome  the problems  of asymmetric  information. They  also
create  mechanisms  for more  effective  support  of long term  expansion  or restructuring
operations.
There  is some  evidence  that bank-based  systems  are better  able  to cultivate  close
links  between  banks  and industrial  companies  (Vittas, 1986). But strong  evidence  that
such  links  have  beneficial  effects  on investment  and aggregate  activity is sti!!  limited,
although  a recent  study  of corporate  investment  in Japan  shows  that companies  that have
severed  their  links  with banks  have  been  more  constrained  by their  internally  generated
funds in their investment  operations  than  companies  with continuing  close  links  (Hoshi  et
al 1989).
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